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Abstract This paper investigates what motivates intergenerational inter-vivos time
and money transfers. We consider a model in which transfers may be driven not only
by altruism, but also by exchange considerations. We use data from the Survey of
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe to discriminate between the two motives.
We show that both if we consider money transfers from parents to children and time
transfers from children to parents, the empirical evidence rejects pure altruism in
favor of exchange. This result has important policy implications on the effectiveness
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of formal care provision as a substitute for informal care and on the impact of taxation
on transfers.
Keywords Intergenerational transfers · Altruism · Exchange
JEL Classification D12 · J14
1 Introduction
In this paper we empirically investigate what motivates individuals to transfer income
and/or to provide care to family members. Altruism is often put forward as an important
motive for money transfers and care provision (see e.g. Becker 1974). In case of altru-
ism, a benevolent individual (say the parent) cares about the well-being of other indi-
viduals (the children). An altruistic parent will make compensatory transfers, i.e. she
will give less money to a rich child than to a poor one. The altruistic model has one other
important implication, the so-called neutrality hypothesis: if income of the donor par-
ent is reduced by 1 dollar and at the same time income of the receiving child is increased
by the same amount, then the parent transfers 1 dollar less to the child. It should be
realized, however, that family relations may be driven not only by altruism or blood
ties, but also by exchange considerations. A strand of the literature stemming from
Bernheim et al. (1985) and Cox (1987) stresses the importance of the exchange motive,
focusing on the role of bequests and inter-vivos transfers as means of payment for atten-
tion and care by adult children to their elderly parents. In case of exchange, a parental
financial transfer does not need to be compensatory. Cox (1987) also claims that in the
exchange regime rich children will provide less care to their parents than poor ones.
Understanding the motives for transfers is crucial in order to assess the possi-
ble effects of e.g. fiscal policy. The well-known “Ricardian equivalence hypothesis”
critically hinges on the assumption that households are altruistic (see Barro 1974).
According to the neutrality result such households could counterbalance the inter-
generational transfer associated with government borrowing by adjusting their own
private transfers. If transfers are mainly motivated by exchange, the neutrality hypoth-
esis does not hold anymore. Motives for money transfers play an important role also
in the relationship between saving and social security wealth (see e.g. Jürges 2001;
Börsh-Supan and Reil-Held 2001). Standard economic theory predicts that in a world
without intergenerational links social security wealth crowds out saving. This relation
between social security wealth and private saving behavior is broken if households
are altruistically linked. However, this is not true if the exchange motive for money
transfers is important.
Several studies have examined the effect of parental and child income on parental
transfers (see Laferrère and Wolff 2006 for a comprehensive review of the empirical lit-
erature). Due to strong data requirements, only a few studies have tested the validity of
the altruism hypothesis by checking the neutrality rule (Altonji et al. 1997; Villanueva
2001; Hochguertel and Ohlsson 2009; Cox and Rank 1992). Those studies typically
find that the difference in the transfer-income derivatives with respect to parental and
child income is rather small and certainly not equal to unity. In other words, the neu-
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trality hypothesis is strongly rejected. McGarry (2000) and Villanueva (2001) propose
extensions of the simple altruism model that explain a small or negative difference
in the transfer-income derivatives.1 It should be stressed that those extended altruism
models still predict that gift amounts from parents are compensatory. Most studies on
US data cited in Laferrère and Wolff (2006) confirm this prediction (see e.g. Altonji
et al. 1997; McGarry and Schoeni 1995; Villanueva 2001). However, Laferrère and
Wolff (2006) also review some studies on French data that typically find that rich chil-
dren receive higher financial gifts from their parents than poor ones, and Cox and his
coauthors find a positive partial correlation between transfers from parents and child’s
income in several studies on US data (see Cox 1987, 1990; Cox and Rank 1992). In
other words, these studies reject the null hypothesis of altruism.
Some empirical studies try to discriminate between the altruistic and exchange
motive by looking at time transfers from children to parents. To be more precise,
these studies test the prediction that in the exchange regime rich children provide less
care than poor ones. Most of these studies do not find support for this prediction and
therefore reject the exchange motive for time and financial transfers (see e.g. Altonji
et al. 2000; Schoeni 1997; Sloan et al. 2002).
The contribution of our paper is twofold. The first contribution concerns an exten-
sion of the theoretical model of Cox (1987) which explains both transfer behavior
of parents and caring decisions by children. The model captures both the altruism
(i.e. the parent possibly donates a transfer to the child because she cares about the
child’s well-being) and the exchange motive (i.e. the child provides care to the parent
in exchange of the transfer which she has received or will receive). The model yields
predictions on both the decision to transfer (and to provide services) and the amount to
transfer (care), conditional on transferring. In comparison with Cox (1987), we obtain
some sharper predictions on the effect of parent’s and child’s income on the amount
of care provided by the child. In case of altruism, we find that this effect is positive
whereas Cox (1987) was not able to sign it.2
The second contribution of our paper is of an empirical nature. We use the 2004 wave
of the Survey of Health Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) to assess whether
money transfer and caring decisions are mainly driven by altruistic or exchange
motives. Earlier empirical studies only analyze inter-vivos money transfers to assess
which of the two motives is more important. As far as we know, this is one of the few
empirical studies that look both at transfer and caring decisions.3 By using more infor-
1 McGarry (2000) considers a dynamic setting where parents are not fully informed about their child’s
future income. Villanueva (2001) not only allows for imperfect information but also for endogenous child’s
effort. His model also explains the violation of the neutrality hypothesis.
2 In order to derive these predictions, we have to make some separability assumptions on the utility functions
of the child and of the parent. However, Cox (1987) makes similar assumptions to establish the negative
relationship between child’s income and the amount of care provided by her to the parent.
3 We only found papers by Schoeni (1997) and Altonji et al. (2000) who use tobit models to estimate the
relation between care and inter-vivos transfers on the one hand and donor and recipient income on the
other. These authors reject the exchange motive for transfers. As we will argue below, one should not use
tobit models to analyze decisions on inter-vivos transfers and care provision. Arrondel and Masson (2001)
model different types of transfers, both in money and in kind, within the same framework. They then provide
evidence on both but with data from different datasets depending on the type of transfer.
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mation, we are able to discriminate more precisely between the altruistic and exchange
motive of time and money transfers. SHARE contains information about three gener-
ations: the respondents, their parents and their children. Therefore, as regards parents-
child relations, it is possible to build two different samples: the one in which we
consider the respondents as parents (the “transfers” sample) and the one in which we
consider the respondents as children (the “old” sample). We use the transfers sample
to analyze financial transfers from parents to their children and the services sample to
analyze services provided by each child to parents. We measure services by the time
spent by each child helping her parents with paperwork or with housekeeping.
Under altruism the sign on the marginal effect of child’s income4 on the transfer
amount (conditional upon transferring) should be negative: altruistic parents should
give more to the children who have less. However, we find a positive marginal effect.
In other words we find that inter-vivos transfers (i.e., transfers between living persons)
cannot solely be explained by pure altruistic motives. Exchange motives might (partly)
govern inter-vivos transfers. In that respect our findings are qualitatively similar to
those of e.g. Cox (1987) and Cox and Rank (1992). The empirical evidence based
on time transfers is even more convincing: children who are worse off provide more
services to their parents. This is fully in line with the exchange motive and certainly
not with the altruistic motive.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the Cox model and spells out
the deviations we propose. Section 3 presents the data and provides some descriptive
statistics. The estimation results are reported in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Theoretical Model
In this paper we take the model of Cox (1987) as starting point of analysis. This model
considers two individuals, say the parent and the child. The parent possibly donates a
transfer to the child because she cares about the child’s well-being (altruistic motive).
In addition, the child provides care to the parent in exchange of the transfer which she
has received. The parent’s utility function is equal to:
U (cp, ck, s) = U
(
cp, s, V (ck, s)
) (1)
where cp is consumption of the parent, s denotes services from the children to the
parent, ck is consumption of the child. U () and V () are the utility functions of the
parent and the child respectively. We assume that the parent is altruistic in the sense
that she cares for the well being of the child, i.e. ∂U/∂V > 0 but she also likes
to receive services from the child (∂U/∂s > 0). We consider the consumption of
both the parent and the child to be normal goods. Moreover, we assume that the
parent’s utility function is strictly concave and that all goods are substitutes, i.e.: Ucc <
0, Uss < 0, Uvv < 0, Ucs ≥ 0, Ucv ≥ 0, Usv ≥ 0.5 As in Bernheim et al. (1985), we
4 In the young sample, child’s income is not observed. We proxy this variable by years of education of the
child.
5 Subscripts s, v and c represent partial derivatives with respect to services, child’s utility and consumption
respectively.
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assume that the utility of the child is first increasing in s until a threshold s¯ and then
decreasing:
∂V (ck, s)
∂s
=
{
Vs(ck, s) ≥ 0 if s ≤ s¯
Vs(ck, s) < 0 if s > s¯
(2)
Cox (1987) assumes it to be monotonically decreasing in s (Cox’s model is equivalent
to s¯ = 0 in our specification). We allow for a positive s¯ to take into account that
children might like to provide some services to their parents. We follow Cox (1987)
in assuming that the child’s utility falls at an increasing rate as services increases
(Vss < 0) and that Vcs ≤ 0, Vcc < 0. There is no uncertainty in the model. The parent
and child face the following budget and non-negativity constraints:
cp ≤ E p − T (3a)
ck ≤ Ek + T (3b)
T ≥ 0; s ≥ s¯ (3c)
where E p and Ek are income respectively of the parent and of the child and T denotes
transfers from parent to child. In her optimization problem the parent should also take
into account that the child only provides services in excess of s¯ if she is compensated
in utility terms through a financial transfer, i.e. s > s¯ ⇒ T > 0. Given the child’s
“threat point” utility level V (Ek, s¯), this constraint can be written as:
V (Ek + T, s) ≥ V (Ek, s¯) (4)
The maximization problem can be written as follows:
max
T,s
U
(
E p − T, s, V (Ek + T, s)
) (5a)
s.t. T ≥ 0; s ≥ s¯ (5b)
V (Ek + T, s) ≥ V (Ek, s¯) (5c)
In a companion working paper (see Alessie et al. 2011) we present conditions under
which the budget set is convex. In that case the parent’s maximization problem has
one unique solution.
We assume that all the bargaining power is assigned to the parent, which implies
that the amount of services received enters the utility function of the parent as a choice
variable. Such an assumption is needed to model altruism within the Becker framework
(see also Cox 1987, p. 517). An alternative approach is to model family decision mak-
ing in a game theoretic framework: Hiedemann and Stern (1999) follow this approach
to describe family decisions about long-term care. Their model accommodates both
for altruism and exchange motives, but does not allow identifying them separately.
The model we propose is static. However, in the empirical implementation we
explicitly take into account that transfers and services occur at different stages of the
life cycle: parents typically transfer when children are young and children provide
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services (such as help with paperwork) when parents are old. We implicitly assume
credibility, i.e. that, after receiving the transfer, the child will indeed provide services
to her parents later in life. As Bernheim et al. (1985) point out, while there might be
substantial incentives to renege on an agreement with an arbitrary third party, to break
a promise made to a family member might be quite costly in terms of reputation and
family relations.
2.1 Altruism
The first case we will consider is that in which the parent is purely altruistic, in the
sense that she transfers to the child more money than what it is strictly necessary to
compensate her for the services provided. In terms of the model, this means constraint
(4) is not binding. We also assume interior solutions for s and T .6 Then the first order
conditions of the optimization problem (5) imply:
− Uc + UvVc = 0 (6a)
Us + UvVs = 0 (6b)
According to Eq. (6a) transfers are used to equate the parent’s marginal utility of
consumption (Uc) with the child’s one from the parent’s viewpoint (UvVc). Likewise,
the parent’s marginal utility of services (Us) is equal to the child’s marginal disutility
of services from the parent’s perspective (UvVs). Notice that the optimal amount of
services is greater than the threshold s¯ [cf. Eq. (2)], i.e. Vs < 0 in the optimum. Cox
proves for transfers the following comparative statics properties of the model in the
altruistic regime (see also Alessie et al. 2011):
∂T
∂ E p
− ∂T
∂ Ek
= 1 (7a)
∂T
∂ E p
> 0; ∂T
∂ Ek
< 0 (7b)
Equation (7a) says that keeping family income E p +Ek constant, an increase in child’s
income is compensated with a dollar-for-dollar reduction in transfers. Since we have
assumed that both child’s and parent’s consumption are normal goods, Eq. (7b) implies
that transfers are compensatory, i.e. a rise in child’s income (keeping parent’s income
constant) leads to a fall in transfers. The intuition is that an altruistic parent should
give more to children who have less independently of any help received.
In the altruistic regime, the parent’s demand for services depends on family income,
and not on the distribution of its components, i.e. ∂s
∂ E p = ∂s∂ Ek . One can also prove that
an increase in either child’s or parent’s income leads to more services (see Alessie et
al. 2011):
6 The case of corner solutions is discussed by Alessie et al. (2011) and Cox (1987).
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∂s
∂ E p
= ∂s
∂ Ek
> 0 (8)
Equation (8) implies that poorer children provide less services. The intuition behind
this result is the following: since the parent is an altruist, the child knows that the
transfer T is independent of the amount of services s provided. Therefore, the child
can provide less services to compensate a reduction of his utility due to a lower income.
2.2 Exchange
In this subsection we again assume an interior solution for s and T . However, con-
trary to the previous subsection we now allow the exchange constraint (4) to be
binding:
V (Ek + T, s) = V (Ek, s¯) (9)
Equation (9) defines an implicit relationship between T and s conditional upon Ek
and s¯:
T = g(s; Ek, s¯) (10)
According to the implicit function theorem and given the assumption Vcs < 0:
gs = ∂g
∂s
= − Vs
Vc
> 0 (11a)
gss = −Vss Vc − Vs VcsV 2c
> 0 (11b)
Substituting Eqs. (9) and (10) into the parent’s utility function (1) gives:
L = U (E p − g(s; Ek, s¯), s, V (Ek, s¯)
) (12)
This utility function is then maximized with respect to s. The first order condition is
as follows:
∂L
∂s
= F(s; E p, Ek, s¯) = −Ucgs + Us = Uc VsVc + Us = 0 (13)
Equation (13) says that in the optimum the parent’s and child’s marginal rate of sub-
stitution of transfers for services
(
−UsUc and VsVc
)
are equal to each other. Now we can
apply the implicit function theorem to the function F defined in Eq. (13) in order to
determine the sign of ∂s
∂ E p and
∂s
∂ Ek . Alessie et al. (2011) show that
∂s
∂ E p
> 0 (14)
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Assuming that the parent’s utility function is additively separable (Ucs = Ucv =
Usv = 0) it holds that:
∂s
∂ Ek
< 0 (15)
Equation (15) implies that a poorer child will provide more services. This is because
the child knows that a utility reduction due to lower income can be compensated by a
higher transfer, which the child can induce providing more services.
Equations (11a) and (14) imply that
∂T
∂ E p
> 0 (16)
Moreover, from Eq. (10) it follows that
∂T
∂ Ek
= ∂s
∂ Ek
gs + gEk ≷ 0 (17)
Since we know that gs > 0, ∂s∂ Ek < 0 (under additive separability of the parent’s utility
function) and gEk > 0 (see Alessie et al. 2011), the overall sign of ∂T∂ Ek is ambiguous.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
We use data from the first wave of the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement
in Europe (SHARE) that was conducted in 2004.7 SHARE is a multi-disciplinary,
cross-national survey that is representative of the population aged 50 and over. The
survey took place in eleven European countries, namely Sweden (SE), Denmark (DK),
Germany (DE), the Netherlands (NL), Belgium (BE), France (FR), Switzerland (CH),
Austria (AT), Italy (IT), Spain (ES), and Greece (GR). The survey contains information
about the socio-economic status of the respondents, as well as information about their
health conditions, and on intergenerational time and money transfers.
The key variables in our analysis are financial transfers from parents to their chil-
dren, and services provided by each child to parents. SHARE provides information
about financial transfers amounting to 250 euros or more (adjusted by exchange rate
and purchasing power) given by the respondent to each of their children in the twelve
months prior to the interview, as well as received by the respondent from her parents. As
for services, we provide estimates with two measures of help. The first is the time spent
by children helping her/his parents with paperwork, such as filling out forms, settling
financial or legal matters. The second is the time spent by children helping her/his par-
ents with practical household help, e.g. with home repairs, gardening, transportation,
7 We do not use data from the second wave because they do not contain information on the socio-
occupational status of the respondents’ parents, which is a key variable in our analysis.
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Fig. 1 Transfer and service decision: descriptive evidence
shopping, household chores.8 As for financial transfers, we have detailed information
about services received by the respondent by each child, and provided by the respon-
dent to each parent. In SHARE respondents are also asked whether they had any type
of contact with their parents and children, including visits, phone calls, e-mails and text
messages. However, we do not use this information on the frequency of contacts. Given
such a broad definition, almost all children had at least some contacts with their par-
ents. The threshold level s¯ in Eq. (3c) is not observed and it is, therefore, impossible to
distinguish the choice to provide services from the choice about the amount of services.
Figure 1 suggests that the timing of financial transfers and services’ provision are
different: while inter-vivos transfers from parents to children take place early in life,
services are provided by adult children to their elderly parents. For this reason we focus
on the respondents and their children sample to test the empirical implications of the
model about transfers (the “transfers” sample), and on respondents and their parents to
analyze services (the “services” sample ).9 Therefore, although the theoretical model
is static, we interpret it dynamically. The dynamic interpretation of the model poses a
8 SHARE provides a third measure of services, namely help with personal care, e.g. dressing, bathing or
showering, eating, getting in or out of bed, using the toilet. We have tried to use also this third measure but
the reduced sample size of those who provide or received help with personal care does not allow obtaining
reliable estimates.
9 The different timing in service and financial transfer, together with the limited number of households for
which responds report information on both their parents and their children, prevent us from estimating a
three generation family constitution model a` la Cigno (2006).
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Table 1 Financial transfers from Respondents to each child
obs % Unconditional Conditional
Mean 90th 95th 99th Mean 50th
SE 3,347 23.72 292.95 973.26 1,216.58 4,866.32 1,234.90 681.28
DK 1,756 18.62 411.12 1,024.01 2,355.22 5,120.03 2,207.71 1,024.01
DE 2,367 17.24 0.08 812.46 2,031.14 7,108.98 2,332.67 1,015.57
NL 2,842 14.43 416.12 513.15 1,693.40 7,184.13 2,884.42 1,026.30
BE 3,188 13.58 1,217.40 509.23 2,546.16 25,461.62 8,963.23 1,527.70
FR 2,680 14.18 613.20 604.76 2,015.87 15,118.99 4,324.69 1,511.90
CH 867 12.80 1,049.79 493.73 2,715.54 9,874.69 8,199.71 1,974.94
AT 1,819 16.44 452.74 521.24 1,563.72 7,297.37 2,754.29 1,042.48
IT 1,464 10.38 533.09 254.96 916.85 10,198.57 5,134.48 835.26
ES 1,692 3.37 197.20 0.00 0.00 4,861.74 5,853.65 1,750.23
GR 1,930 14.25 662.18 644.30 2,577.19 9,277.87 4,647.29 1,288.59
Total 23,952 15.22 563.09 583.96 1,932.89 9,178.71 3,699.13 1,007.93
credibility problem: children could renege on their promise to help their parents in the
future after receiving the monetary transfer. What we need to assume is that people
are reluctant to break promises made within the family: indeed, while there might be
quite substantial incentives to renege on an agreement with an arbitrary third party, to
do so with a family member might be quite costly in terms of reputation and family
relations. This seems a reasonable assumption: Peters et al. (2004) provide evidence
from laboratory experiment that individuals linked by family ties tend to free ride less
frequently in a public good game compared to strangers.
In Table 1 we report the percentage of children who receive a monetary gift from
the respondents in the transfers sample, the mean amount they receive, the 90th,
the 95th and the 99th percentiles and the mean and median amount of the transfer
for those who have received it. The data show substantial cross-country heterogeneity
(see Zissimopoulos and Smith 2009, for a comparison with the US) : the percentage of
children who receive a transfer ranges from a low 3.4 % in Spain to 23.7 % in Sweden.10
However, conditional on receiving, children in Sweden are those who receive the
lowest amount, while the highest transfers are found in Belgium, Switzerland and
Spain. Monetary transfers from parents to their children are very unequally distributed
in the SHARE countries: children in the top 5 % receive almost four times more than
the mean amount. In Table 2 we report the same descriptive statistics for the services
sample. It is interesting to note that Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands are the
countries with the highest incidence of homecare provision from respondents to their
10 Notice that while the percentage of children who receive a transfer from their parents is 15.2 %, in our
sample only 2.1 % of parents receive any financial help from their children. Arrondel and Masson (2001)
found a similar figure (2.7 %) for financial transfers from children to parents in France. Although this is
not a formal test of assumption T ≥ 0 in (3c), it suggests that the theoretical model in this respect is not at
odds with the empirical evidence.
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Table 2 Days of care per month provided by respondents to their parents
obs % Unconditional Conditional
Mean 90th 95th 99th Mean 50th
Help with paperwork
SE 562 15.7 0.92 1 4 30 5.38 2.5
DK 297 13.1 0.61 0.5 1 30 4.33 1
DE 388 15.7 1.28 1 4 30 7.97 4
NL 479 14.0 0.62 1 4 4 3.76 4
BE 584 16.4 1.61 4 4 30 8.48 4
FR 586 13.3 1.26 1 4 30 8.78 4
CH 169 11.8 0.56 0.5 1 30 4.60 1
AT 235 9.8 0.53 0 1 30 5.43 1
IT 349 10.3 1.26 0.5 4 30 11.2 4
ES 345 13.0 1.42 0.5 4 30 10.2 1
GR 521 10.0 1.08 0.5 4 30 10.5 4
Total 4,515 13.4 1.08 1 4 30 7.44 4
Homecare help
SE 562 29.4 1.63 4 4 30 5.04 1
DK 297 31.3 1.48 4 4 30 4.51 1
DE 388 24.7 1.65 4 4 30 6.44 2.5
NL 479 26.9 1.17 4 4 30 3.88 4
BE 584 25.3 2.39 4 30 30 8.36 4
FR 586 17.6 1.25 1 4 30 6.57 1
CH 169 13.0 0.75 0.5 4 30 5.75 1
AT 235 16.6 1.15 4 4 30 6.78 4
IT 349 12.9 1.92 2 30 30 14.60 4
ES 345 13.9 2.18 4 30 30 14.90 4
GR 521 15.7 2.06 4 30 30 12.30 4
Total 4,515 21.5 1.68 4 4 30 7.27 4
elderly parents, while Spain, Italy and Greece are those with the lowest; however, if
we look at the number of hours spent helping, the pattern is reversed. If we focus on
those who provide help, a clear North-South gradient emerges: in Southern Europe,
where family ties are very strong, the mean number of hours spent by adult children
providing help with paperwork and homecare to their parents is more than double than
in the Nordic countries.11
SHARE provides some demographics about each respondent’s child and parent. In
each household the family respondent, who is randomly selected, provides informa-
tion about gender, age, distance from respondent’s house, marital status and number of
11 The numbers reported in Tables 1 and 2 are slightly different from those presented in Fig. 1 since they
refer to the estimation sample rather than to the full dataset.
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Table 3 Transfers sample, respondents as parents
Full sample Transfer No transfer
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
income-p ppp-adjusted gross total
household income of
the parent
37,509 102,290 51,447 50,438 34,511 110,108
yedu-p Maximum number of
years of education of
the parent and his/her
partner(current or
former)
10.50 4.48 12.30 3.88 10.10 4.52
yedu-c Years of education of the
child
12.40 3.58 13.30 2.98 12.30 3.66
age-c Age of the child 40.00 9.94 35.10 8.93 40.90 9.81
married-c Dummy, 1 if the child is
married or in a
registered partnership
0.78 0.42 0.67 0.47 0.80 0.40
female-c Dummy, 1 if the child
is a woman
0.51 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.50
nchild-c Number of children of the child 1.36 1.23 1.04 1.15 1.42 1.24
sibling-c Number of siblings of the child 1.87 1.41 1.37 0.99 1.92 1.44
age-p Age of the parent 68.40 9.94 64.20 8.95 69.30 9.89
married-p Dummy, 1 if the parent is
married or in a
registered partnership
0.61 0.49 0.72 0.49 0.59 0.49
female-p Dummy, 1 if the child is a
woman
0.55 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.57 0.50
badhealth-p Dummy, 1 if the parent
self report to be in less
than good health
0.40 0.49 0.27 0.44 0.43 0.46
kids of each child.12 In SHARE we can distinguish biological and legally adopted chil-
dren from step-children. The latter are excluded from our analysis, since the relation
between parents and step children cannot be analyzed within the same framework. We
also exclude children who are younger than 18 years old in order to rule out transfers
for educational purposes and transfers forced by law, e.g. alimony. Finally, we exclude
children who live with their parents since in this case it is very difficult to properly
quantify financial transfers, which might also take the form of lower accommodation
and food expenditure, and SHARE does not report information on the amount of ser-
vice provision within the household. We construct the transfers sample as a child-level
file where the unit of observation is the child and the relevant information about the
respondent is replicated for each child, as in Angelini (2007) and Callegaro and Pasini
(2008). Table 3 shows that respondents who give monetary gifts have on average higher
12 Gender, age and distance from respondent’s house are reported for each child, whereas time and type of
care provided to the parents, marital status and number of kids is only asked for up to four children. When
there are more than four children, the program sorts them in ascending order by minor, proximity and birth
year, where minor is defined as 0 for all children aged 18 and over and 1 for all others, and then selects the
first four. Still, the selection introduced by the survey scheme is limited: all the relevant information for our
analysis is collected on the 94.78 % of the children.
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Table 4 Services sample, respondents as children
Full sample Service No service
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
ISCO-p Maximum between the
International
Socio-Economic Index
of the parents (see
Ganzeboom et al. 1992).
43.5 21.1 50.4 19.4 42.5 21.1
For people who work the
ISCO code refers to
their main job, for the
retired it refers to the
last job before
retirement;
homemaker-p Dummy equal to 1 if both
the parents are
homemakers. In this case
ISCO-p is equal to 0.
0.10 0.29 0.04 0.20 0.10 0.30
income-c ppp-adjusted gross
total household
55,622 184,081 57,125 56,017 55,382 196,583
yedu-c Years of education of the child 12.00 3.94 13.00 3.55 11.80 3.97
age-c Age of the child 56.20 5.36 56.70 5.15 56.10 5.39
married-c Dummy, 1 if the child is
married or in a
registered partnership
0.74 0.44 0.74 0.44 0.74 0.49
female-c Dummy, 1 if the child
is a woman
0.53 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.53 0.50
nchild-c Number of children of the child 2.09 1.29 1.96 1.25 2.11 1.29
sibling-c Number of siblings of the child 2.72 2.05 2.25 1.71 2.79 2.09
age-p Maximum between the
age of the parents
82.70 6.73 84.10 5.81 82.40 6.84
mo-alive Dummy, 1 if only the
mother is still alive
0.63 0.48 0.72 0.45 0.62 0.49
fa-alive Dummy, 1 if only the
father is still alive
0.12 0.32 0.07 0.25 0.13 0.33
badhealth-p Dummy, 1 if either the
father or the mother self
report to be in less than
good health
0.63 0.48 0.70 0.46 0.62 0.49
income and education level. It is also interesting to note that children tend to receive
transfers early in life: those who receive money are on average 5 years younger than
those who do not receive any gift.
Information about parents is limited, compared to what we know about children:
only family respondents are asked about services given and received from their parent’s
household, which parent is still alive and her or his age, and a subjective health measure
for each living parent. We do not know the income and education level of the parents.
However, we have information on their last job, which we use to construct a measure
of their socio-occupational prestige (see Ganzeboom et al. 1992). The services sample
contains less observations than the transfers sample. It should be noted (Table 4)
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that parents who receive services from their children have on average higher socio-
occupational prestige, while we do not observe large differences in the composition
of the sample as regards the other variables. The comparison between the first column
of Tables 3 and 4 clearly highlights the differences between the two samples. In the
transfers sample children are middle-aged (40 years old on average) and their parents
are on average 68.4 years old and prevalently in good health; in the services sample
children are towards the end of their working career (average age is 56.2) and their
surviving parents tend to be older than 80 years old and in bad health. In addition,
because of the declining fertility rates in Europe, families in the services sample are
on average larger than those in the transfers sample.
4 Multivariate analysis
4.1 Transfers
In Table 5 we estimate the decision to transfer with a probit model (column 1), and
the decision about the amount to transfer with a linear regression (column 2). The
regression on column (2) is estimated conditional on performing an inter-vivos trans-
fer, i.e. it is run on the sub-sample of children who receive a positive transfer from their
parents. This is coherent with the empirical implications obtained in Sect. 2: the model
provides testable predictions about the marginal effect of E p and Ek on the decision to
transfer and on the amount to transfer, conditional on transferring a positive amount.
In addition, the Tobit model is unsuitable in this context because we would need to
assume that the explanatory variables enter with the same sign both the equation on
the decision to transfer and that on the amount to transfer. However, our theoretical
model predicts different sign configurations for the income of the child, which is our
crucial variable. An alternative would be to use the Heckman selection model but we
have no credible exclusion restrictions. This is one of the main reasons why in the
health econometrics literature the two-part model is in general considered preferable
(see e.g. Madden 2008). The units of observation in the transfer sample are respon-
dents’ children, therefore we treat the dataset as a panel, where the cross sectional
dimension is given by the different households, while the longitudinal one represents
children within the same households, and we estimate the model with random effects.
This procedure allows us to control for correlated household-specific effects. The cru-
cial assumption for a random effects estimator is that the household-specific effect
is uncorrelated with all explanatory variables. The fixed effects estimator does not
require such an assumption since it is based on within-group heterogeneity. The price
to pay is that with fixed effects the parameters of time-invariant explanatory variables
cannot be estimated. In our application, the characteristics of the parents—among
which proxies for E p which is important to assess the validity of our model—vary
only between households and not within households, thus precluding the possibility
of using household fixed effects rather than random effects. Mundlak (1978) provides
an alternative estimation procedure which partly overcomes the drawbacks of random
effects: he proves that if the whole set of regressors X varies within-groups, running
a fixed effects regression of a variable of interest yi,t on X i,t is equivalent to per-
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Table 5 Respondents as parent: transfer equation
Random effects Mundlak
probit cond OLS probit cond OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
income-p .320∗∗∗ .084∗∗∗ .310∗∗∗ .082∗∗∗
(.037) (.025) (.037) (.025)
yedu-p .098∗∗∗ .041∗∗∗ .083∗∗∗ .038∗∗∗
(.010) (.007) (.010) (.007)
yedu-c −.014∗ .019∗∗∗ −.040∗∗∗ .013∗
(.008) (.006) (.010) (.008)
age-c −.0006∗∗∗ −.0002 −.001∗∗∗ −.001∗∗
(.0002) (.0002) (.0004) (.0004)
married-c −.559∗∗∗ −.020 −.549∗∗∗ .009
(.051) (.035) (.060) (.042)
female-c .183∗∗∗ −.050∗ .188∗∗∗ −.063∗
(.041) (.029) (.046) (.033)
nchild-c .027 −.052∗∗∗ .064∗∗∗ −.055∗∗∗
(.020) (.015) (.024) (.018)
sibling-c −.380∗∗∗ −.071∗∗∗ −.365∗∗∗ −.072∗∗∗
(.030) (.023) (.030) (.023)
age-p −.040∗∗∗ .008∗∗∗ −.038∗∗∗ .007∗∗
(.004) (.003) (.004) (.003)
married-p .243∗∗∗ .069 .230∗∗∗ .072
(.075) (.056) (.075) (.056)
female-p −.320∗∗∗ −.005 −.313∗∗∗ −.006
(.065) (.047) (.066) (.047)
badhealth-p −.377∗∗∗ −.076 −.355∗∗∗ −.070
(.069) (.052) (.069) (.052)
SE .806∗∗∗ −.235∗∗∗ .876∗∗∗ −.230∗∗∗
(.125) (.086) (.125) (.087)
DK .281∗ .002 .345∗∗ .013
(.144) (.102) (.144) (.103)
NL −.141 .159 −.107 .164∗
(.132) (.097) (.132) (.097)
BE .073 .701∗∗∗ .121 .708∗∗∗
(.130) (.096) (.130) (.096)
FR .125 .513∗∗∗ .187 .523∗∗∗
(.137) (.100) (.138) (.100)
CH −.426∗∗ .593∗∗∗ −.364∗ .601∗∗∗
(.191) (.146) (.191) (.146)
AT .194 −.026 .233 −.026
(.143) (.103) (.143) (.103)
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Table 5 continued
Random effects Mundlak
probit cond OLS probit cond OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IT .245 .394∗∗∗ .263 .403∗∗∗
(.172) (.130) (.172) (.130)
ES −.913∗∗∗ 1.065∗∗∗ −.908∗∗∗ 1.059∗∗∗
(.210) (.186) (.210) (.186)
GR .653∗∗∗ .728∗∗∗ .646∗∗∗ .714∗∗∗
(.151) (.108) (.151) (.108)
avg-age-c .0009∗∗ .001∗∗∗
(.0004) (.0004)
avg-married-c −.0008 −.098
(.117) (.080)
avg-female-c −.028 .056
(.098) (.070)
avg-nchild-c −.143∗∗∗ .015
(.047) (.036)
avg-yedu-c .069∗∗∗ .015
(.016) (.012)
Observations 23,952 3,646 23,952 3,646
Households 10,938 2,421 10,938 2,421
Log-likelihood −7,580.678 −7,562.999
σu 2.161 .985 2.171 .984
Standard errors are in parenthesis, * significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %. Column
(1) and (2) are estimated with random effects where the cross sectional dimension is variation between
households, while the longitudinal dimension captures variation among children within the same household.
Column (3) and (4) are estimated using the Mundlak approach. The Mundlak terms avg-age-c, avg-married-
c, avg-female-c, avg-nchild-c, avg-yedu-c are the within household averges of the corresponding variables.
The joint test of their significance in column (4) is distributed as a χ25 , with p = 0.08. The depedent
variable as well as income-p are inverse hyperbolic-sine transformations of the original monetary values.
Since this transformation is not scale invariant, we re-estimated the four equations applying a simple log
transformation and dropping the 5 observations with income-p equal to 0 and also using the variables in
levels. Results are virtually unchanged
form a random effects regression of the same yi,t on (X i,t , Zi ), where Zi is a vector
containing the averages within-groups of the X regressors. In columns (3) and (4)
of Table 5 we include among the regressors the within households averages of the
time varying children characteristics. This means that we are assuming the error term
to be uncorrelated only with the regressors which are constant within households.
Estimated coefficients with the Mundlak procedure are not statistically different from
those estimated with the baseline random effects procedure.
We proxy Ek with the number of years of education of the child (yedu-c), while
E p is measured by current household income of the parent (income-p) and the maxi-
mum level of education attained by the parents (yedu-p), which is a better proxy for
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permanent income. The results show that Ek has a negative effect on the probability
to transfer, as predicted by the model when we assume separability. In addition, E p
has a positive and significant effect both on the probability to perform a transfer and
on the amount to be transferred. Both results confirm the validity of the model, and
thus allows us to further test altruism versus the exchange model. Under altruism the
sign on the marginal effect of variable proxying Ek in column 2 should be negative
and significant: altruistic parents should give more to the children who have less. On
the contrary, in our estimates the coefficient is positive and strongly significant, thus
rejecting pure altruism in favor of exchange.13
As regards the other variables, the results confirm that elderly parents are more
likely to transfer money to young children. Mothers and parents in bad health are
less likely to transfer and when they do, they do not transfer less than fathers and
healthy parents. On the other hand, single parents give both less and less often. The
higher the number of siblings, the lower the likelihood of receiving a monetary gift
and the amount received. It is interesting to note that Sweden is the country where we
observe the largest number of monetary gifts but the lowest amounts transferred, while
Spain is the country with the lowest number of transfers but the largest amounts trans-
ferred. This evidence may reflect differences in welfare state regimes across countries:
Mediterranean countries have strong social safety nets with respect to income and care
transfers, while Scandinavian countries have extended publicly provided (and publicly
subsidized) care services for the elderly.
4.2 Services
We now turn to services. Table 6 reports the estimates of a two-part model for the help
with paperwork provided to parents by their children (columns 1 and 2) and those
for a second measure of services, i.e help with housekeeping (columns 3 and 4). The
marginal effects in column (1) and (3) are obtained by a probit regression with as
dependent variable a dummy which takes value 1 if the child provided any help, while
the coefficients in column (2) and (4) are estimated by a OLS regression with as depen-
dent variable the number of days per month spent by children helping their parents, for
those who provide help. The first two variables (I SC Op and homemakerp) measure
the socio-occupational prestige of the parents based on reported ISCO codes,14 and
are proxies for E p, while Ek is measured by the income and the number of years
of education of the child. Since we interpret the model dynamically, we believe that
what matters is not current income but permanent income, which is better proxied
by education. The results of the OLS equation show that children who are worse off
provide more services to their parents and are, therefore, consistent with exchange.
The behavior of the control variables is in general consistent with the literature.
Gender seems to be a significant determinant of time transfers: daughters tend to
13 We have estimated the same models by restricting the sample only to children aged 25 or over to make
sure to exclude transfers for further education but the results, are virtually unaffected reported.
14 ISCO codes refer to the International Standard Classification of Occupation provided by the International
Labour Organization (ILO).
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Table 6 Respondents as children: service equation
Paperwork Homecare
probit cond OLS probit cond OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ISCO-p .007∗∗∗ −.039 .003 −.039∗
(.002) (.035) (.002) (.023)
homemaker-p −.075 −1.779 −.042 −3.217∗
(.133) (3.044) (.109) (1.825)
income-c −.013 −.514 .006 −.014
(.024) (.423) (.021) (.371)
yedu-c .027∗∗∗ −.406∗∗ .001 −.371∗∗∗
(.008) (.188) (.007) (.131)
age-c −.009 .184 −.014∗∗∗ .211∗∗
(.006) (.114) (.005) (.088)
married-c .022 −.249 −.010 −.931
(.061) (1.141) (.054) (.836)
female-c .151∗∗∗ 2.250∗∗ .237∗∗∗ 1.911∗∗∗
(.049) (.909) (.044) (.645)
sibling-c −.075∗∗∗ −.201 −.065∗∗∗ −.340∗
(.015) (.283) (.012) (.202)
nchild-c −.044∗∗ .411 −.073∗∗∗ .397
(.022) (.353) (.019) (.288)
age-p .028∗∗∗ .167∗ .020∗∗∗ .210∗∗∗
(.005) (.098) (.004) (.073)
mo-alive .214∗∗∗ 1.859∗ .136∗∗ −.038
(.061) (1.127) (.053) (.789)
fa-alive −.222∗∗ −1.780 −.606∗∗∗ .602
(.099) (2.160) (.094) (2.031)
badhealth-p .230∗∗∗ 1.074 .154∗∗∗ 1.635∗∗
(.052) (.946) (.046) (.660)
SE .076 −5.211∗∗∗ .200∗∗ −3.761∗∗∗
(.105) (1.887) (.094) (1.301)
DK −.054 −4.836∗∗ .255∗∗ −2.696∗∗
(.124) (1.939) (.105) (1.305)
NL .056 −5.388∗∗∗ .185∗ −3.433∗∗∗
(.111) (1.673) (.097) (1.243)
BE .211∗∗ −1.352 .130 .552
(.104) (1.922) (.094) (1.401)
FR .071 −.904 −.139 −1.869
(.107) (2.030) (.097) (1.458)
CH −.113 −4.255∗ −.416∗∗∗ −1.323
(.152) (2.383) (.145) (2.132)
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Table 6 continued
Paperwork Homecare
Probit cond OLS Probit cond OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AT −.189 −3.074 −.235∗ −.997
(.142) (2.502) (.125) (1.806)
IT −.118 −.064 −.416∗∗∗ 5.231∗∗
(.128) (2.593) (.119) (2.246)
ES .183 −1.404 −.267∗∗ 4.213∗
(.126) (2.675) (.118) (2.443)
GR −.132 .971 −.297∗∗∗ 4.993∗∗∗
(.114) (2.386) (.102) (1.826)
Observations 4,515 605 4,515 970
Log-likelihood −1,659.713 −2,270.433 −2,192.117 −3,579.71
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis, * significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 %.
Income-c is the hyperbolic-sine transformation of the original monetary value. Since hyperbolic-sine trans-
formation is not scale invariant, we re-estimated the four equations applying a simple log transformation:
results are virtually unchanged
provide more help than sons and female parents are more likely to receive it. Parents
who are old or in bad health tend to receive more services from their children. However,
the higher the number of siblings, the less likely that the child will provide help. As
regards country dummies, while we do not observe large cross-country variations
in the decision to provide services, the number of hours spent by children to help
their parents with paperwork is significantly lower in Northern countries (Sweden,
Denmark and the Netherlands) than in the rest of Europe. Such a result is consistent
with previous literature on the same data, e.g. Callegaro and Pasini (2008).
5 Conclusions
The modeling of intergenerational transfers is of central importance to tackle inequal-
ities across or within families, heterogeneities in transmission behaviors and family
relations and substitution or complementarity with other intergenerational transfers
(human investment in children, social security benefits). Family relations may be
driven not only by altruism or blood ties, but also by exchange considerations. In
this paper we extend the standard model of transfers by Cox (1987) to derive sharper
predictions on whether inter-vivos transfers of money and time are motivated by altru-
ism or exchange considerations. We then provide empirical evidence on the relative
importance of the two motives using data from the first wave of the Survey on Health,
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) on individuals aged 50 or over in eleven
European countries. We contribute to the existing empirical literature on the topic
testing both implications about the transfer and about the caring decisions. We show
that both if we consider money transfers from parents to children and if we consider
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time transfers from children to parents, the empirical evidence rejects pure altruism in
favor of exchange. Parents do not give more to children who have less, as predicted by
altruism, and children who are worse off provide more care to their parents. We also
document that while financial transfers from parents to children seem to take place
early in life, time services are provided by adult children to their elderly parents. The
relevance of the exchange motive in determining money transfers and care provision
between generations has important policy implications on the effectiveness of formal
care provision as a substitute for informal care as well as on the impact of taxation on
inter-vivos transfers. A low taxation on intervivos may induce wealthy households to
reduce their asset base and transferring resources as gifts to their children in order to
pay less taxes on investment income (see e.g. Poterba 1998). Such an expected effect
suggests policy makers to increase taxes on gifts in order to increase tax revenues.
Nevertheless, results from our analysis clarify that intervivos are at least in part an
anticipated payment for future informal care from the child, then a higher tax rate
on intergenerational monetary transfers is likely to reduce the demand of informal
care and increase the demand for formal care, thus increasing public spending on
healthcare.
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